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The Second Circuit’s Cantero Decision Is Wrong about
Preemption under the National Bank Act
Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
On September 15, 2022, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals issued its decision in
Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A.1 Cantero held that the National Bank Act (NBA) preempted
the application to national banks of a New York law requiring home mortgage lenders to pay a
minimum rate of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. The Second Circuit declared that New
York’s “minimum-interest requirement would exert control over a banking power granted by the
federal government, so it would impermissibly interfere with national banks’ exercise of that
power.”2
The Second Circuit’s decision is clearly erroneous and should be rejected by the Supreme
Court. Cantero creates a direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ decision in
Lusnak v. Bank of America, N.A.,3 which upheld a similar California law mandating the payment
of a minimum rate of interest on mortgage escrow accounts. Lusnak properly applied the
governing preemption standard under the NBA—namely, whether a state consumer financial law
“prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its powers.”4 The
Supreme Court established that standard in Barnett Bank of Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson,5 and

1

49 F.4th 121 (2d Cir. 2022) [hereinafter Cantero].
Id. at 125.
3
883 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 567 (2018) [hereinafter Lusnak]. The Second Circuit noted that
Bank of America, “which was also the defendant in Lusnak, does not try to distinguish that case and argues instead
that it was wrongly decided.” Cantero, 49 F.4th at 129.
4
Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1191, 1193 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)).
5
517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996) [hereinafter Barnett Bank].
2

Congress codified that standard in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act.6
The Second Circuit’s assertion that the NBA preempts any state law that “would exert
control over a banking power granted by the federal government” is contrary to the “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard established by Barnett Bank and codified by DoddFrank. The Second Circuit effectively adopted a per se rule invalidating all state laws that place
any limitation on the exercise of any “power” granted to national banks by federal law. The
Second Circuit’s approach would result in the preemption of all state laws regulating the exercise
of national bank powers, including state regulations that have insignificant effects on the
operations of national banks. The Second Circuit’s per se rule contravenes the more narrowlytailored preemption standard that Congress codified in the Dodd-Frank Act.
The Second Circuit’s view of preemption under the NBA is also contradicted by four key
Supreme Court decisions that provided the foundation for Barnett Bank’s preemption standard.
In each of those decisions, the Supreme Court upheld a state law that imposed a reasonable,
nondiscriminatory limitation on the exercise of a national bank power. The Supreme Court
recognized the validity of those four decisions in Barnett Bank and in two subsequent cases –
Atherton v. FDIC7 and Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.8
The Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to review the direct conflict between
Cantero and Lusnak. In Kivett v. Flagstar Bank, FSB,9 the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its decision
in Lusnak and again held that the NBA did not preempt California’s minimum-interest-on-

6

Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044, 124 Stat. 1376, 2015 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)) [hereinafter
Dodd-Frank].
7
519 U.S. 213 (1997).
8
557 U.S. 519 (2009).
9
No. 21-15667, 2022 WL 1553266 (9th Cir., May 17, 2022) [hereinafter Kivett].
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mortgage-escrow statute. On October 13, 2022, Flagstar Bank filed a petition for certiorari
requesting that the Supreme Court overturn the Ninth Circuit’s holdings in Lusnak and Kivett and
adopt the Second Circuit’s position in Cantero.10
The Supreme Court recently admonished federal courts that they “must follow” the clear
mandate of a federal statute and cannot “override a lawful congressional command” by relying
on inconsistent language “extracted” from prior Supreme Court opinions.11 As shown below, the
Second Circuit disregarded that admonition in Cantero. The Second Circuit ignored the plain
meaning of the “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard codified in the DoddFrank Act. The Second Circuit based its per se preemption rule on statements drawn from
Supreme Court opinions that were issued many years ago and dealt with federally-chartered
institutions that were far different from present-day national banks. The views on preemption
expressed in those decisions have been superseded by the “prevents or significantly interferes”
preemption standard that the Supreme Court established in Barnett Bank and Congress codified
in the Dodd-Frank Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court should reject Cantero and endorse the
Ninth Circuit’s proper application of the NBA’s governing preemption standard in Lusnak.
1. The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero
In Cantero, the Second Circuit held that the NBA preempted the application to national
banks of New York General Obligations Law (NYGOL) § 5-601. Section 5-601 requires each
“mortgage investing institution” that is “located” in New York to pay a minimum rate of interest

10

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Flagstar Bank, FSB v. Kivett, No. 22-349 (U.S. Supreme Court, filed Oct. 13,
2022), 2022 WL 8258634. A federal district court in Rhode Island recently held that the NBA preempted Rhode
Island’s minimum-interest-on-mortgage-escrow statute. The district court agreed with Cantero and concluded that
the Rhode Island statute was preempted because it “places ‘limits’ on an incidental power [of national banks]; here,
the power to establish escrow accounts. These limitations therefore ‘significantly interfere’ with a national banks’
[sic] incidental powers to utilize mortgage escrow accounts.” Conti v. Citizens Bank, N.A., C.A. No. 1:21-CV00296-MSM-PAS, at *4 (D.R.I., Sept. 28, 2022), 2022 WL 4535251. The district court’s decision was appealed to
the First Circuit Court of Appeals on October 14, 2022.
11
Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1520, 1528 (2022).
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on outstanding balances held in mortgage escrow accounts. Lenders establish mortgage escrow
accounts to ensure the timely payment of property taxes and liability insurance premiums owed
by borrowers. Section 5-601 requires lenders to pay a minimum interest rate on mortgage
escrow accounts equal to either 2% or an alternative “rate prescribed by the [New York]
superintendent of financial services.”
Four residents of New York (the “Cantero Plaintiffs” and the “Hymes Plaintiffs”) filed
class-action lawsuits against Bank of America, N.A. (BofA) for failing to pay interest on their
mortgage escrow accounts. The Cantero Plaintiffs entered into their mortgage prior to DoddFrank’s effective date, while the Hymes Plaintiffs received their mortgage after that date.12 A
federal district court denied BofA’s motion to dismiss both lawsuits on grounds of federal
preemption under the NBA.13
The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, declaring that the NBA
“displaces all state laws that purport to ‘control’ banks’ exercise of [enumerated and incidental]
powers.”14 The Second Circuit said that it did not matter whether NYGOL § 5-601 prescribed a
minimum interest rate that was “not very high.”15 The Second Circuit determined that the same
preemption standard applied both before and after Dodd-Frank’s effective date. The Second
Circuit held that (i) the pre-Dodd-Frank preemption standard was established by Barnett Bank,
and (ii) Dodd-Frank “did not change the preexisting [Barnett Bank] standard, but rather
explicitly codified it.”16 The Second Circuit also recognized that the preemption standard

12

Cantero, 49 F.4th at 127-28.
Hymes v. Bank of America, N.A., 408 F. Supp. 3d 171 (E.D.N.Y. 2019) [hereinafter Hymes], rev’d sub nom.
Cantero v. Bank of America, N.A., 49 F.4th 121 (2d Cir. 2022).
14
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 139. The Second Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that national banks “have
the incidental ‘power to provide escrow services’ in connection with home mortgage loans.” Id. at 126 (quoting
Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 193).
15
Id. at 139.
16
Id. at 130-31, 135-36 (quote at 135).
13
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established by Barnett Bank and codified by Dodd-Frank in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B) is whether
a state consumer financial law “prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the
national bank of its powers.”17
The district court in Hymes determined that the New York statute’s “degree of
interference” with BofA’s exercise of its powers was “minimal.”18 The district court found that
NYGOL § 5-601 required BofA to pay a “modest” rate of interest, which would “cost the Bank
money,” but the statute allowed BofA to “administer mortgage escrow accounts” in a manner
that was “relatively unimpaired and unhampered by the state law.”19 At the same time, the
district court cautioned that a state law requiring national banks to pay “punitively high rates” on
escrow accounts “could very well significantly interfere with national banks’ power to
administer escrow accounts.”20
The district court agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Lusnak, which upheld a
similar California statute.21 The Ninth Circuit held that California’s minimum-interest-onmortgage-escrow statute “does not prevent or significantly interfere” with a federally-authorized
power of national banks, and “[m]inor interference with federal objectives is not enough” to
satisfy Barnett Bank’s preemption standard codified in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).22 Like the
district court in Hymes, the Ninth Circuit warned in Lusnak that “a state law setting punitively
high rates” could “prevent or significantly interfere with a bank's ability to engage in the
business of banking,” thereby resulting in preemption by the NBA.23

17

Id. at 135 (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)); see also id. at 130-31 (quoting Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33).
Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 195.
19
Id. at 185-86, 195-96.
20
Id. at 196 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
21
Id. at 185 (“This Court finds Lusnak persuasive and reaches the same result.”).
22
Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1191-95 (quotes at 1194).
23
Id. at 1195 n.7.
18
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The Second Circuit “reject[ed]” the “approach” of the district court in Hymes.24 Citing
several Supreme Court decisions dating back to McCulloch v. Maryland,25 the Second Circuit
held that the correct standard for determining preemption under the NBA is “not how much a
state law impacts a national bank, but whether it purports to ‘control’ the exercise of its
powers.”26 The Second Circuit declared that “state laws exercising control over national
banks—even if their own practical effect may be minimal—are invalid if, when aggregated with
similar laws of other states, they would threaten to undermine a federal banking power.”27 The
Second Circuit further explained:
To determine whether the NBA conflicts with a state law, we ask whether
enforcement of the law at issue would exert control over a banking power—and
thus, if taken to its extreme, threaten to “destroy” the grant made by the federal
government. . . . We do not endeavor to assess whether the degree of the state
law’s impact on national banks would be sufficient to undermine that power.28
In addition to BofA’s preemption claim under the NBA, BofA argued that NYGOL § 5601 was also preempted by 12 C.F.R. § 34.4, a regulation adopted by the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) in 2004 and modified by the OCC in 2011. The Second
Circuit “d[id] not reach that question,” holding that “‘the NBA itself—independent of [the]
OCC’s regulation—preempts the application’ of GOL § 5-601 to national banks.”29 However,

24

Cantero, 49 F.4th at 131.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) [hereinafter McCulloch].
26
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 131 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431).
27
Id. at 132.
28
Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431).
29
Id. at 139 n.13 (quoting Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1, 21 n.13 (2007)); see also id. at 128 n.5
(stating that “we do not reach” BofA’s claims “related to the preemptive effect of OCC regulations”).
25
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the Second Circuit stated that its “conclusion” concerning the NBA’s preemption of Section 5601 was “consistent” with the OCC’s 2004 and 2011 preemption rules.30
The Second Circuit also disagreed with the reliance of the district court and the Ninth
Circuit on Section 1639d of the Truth in Lending Act. 31 As amended by Dodd-Frank, Section
1639d(g)(3) provides that mortgage lenders must pay interest on mortgage escrow accounts if (i)
their borrowers are required to establish such accounts pursuant to Section 1639d(b) and (ii)
interest payments are “prescribed by applicable State or Federal law.”32 The district court and
the Ninth Circuit concluded that Section 1639d reflected “Congress’ view that creditors,
including large corporate banks like Bank of America, can comply with state escrow interest
laws without any significant interference with their banking powers.”33 In contrast, the Second
Circuit determined that Section 1639d had “no relevance to this case” because the Cantero
Plaintiffs and the Hymes Plaintiffs were not required to establish mortgage escrow accounts, and
Section 1639d therefore did not govern their claims against BofA.34
2. The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero is contrary to the governing preemption
standard established by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank and codified by
Congress in the Dodd-Frank Act.

30

Id. at 135.
See Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 186-90, 196-98 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 1639d); Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1194-96
(same).
32
15 U.S.C. § 1639d(b) (specifying when borrowers may be required to establish mortgage escrow accounts); id.
§1639d(g)(3) (“If prescribed by applicable State or Federal law, each creditor shall pay interest to the consumer on
the amount held in any . . . escrow account that is subject to this section in the manner as prescribed by that
applicable State or Federal law.”).
33
Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1196; see also id. at 1194-95 (stating that Section 1639d(g)(3) “expresses Congress’s view
that [state laws requiring payment of interest on mortgage escrow accounts] would not necessarily prevent or
significantly interfere with a national bank’s operations”); Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 198 (stating that “Section
1639d(g)(3) represents Congress’s judgment that mortgage lenders can comply with reasonable state escrow interest
laws.”).
34
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 137.
31
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a. The Second Circuit did not follow the “prevent or significantly interfere” standard
established by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank
In Barnett Bank, the Supreme Court held that a federal statute (12 U.S.C. § 92) preempted
a Florida law that prohibited national banks from acting as insurance agents in small towns if
those banks were subsidiaries of bank holding companies. 35 Applying conflict preemption
principles, the Court held that the dispositive question was “whether or not the Federal and State
Statutes are in ‘irreconcilable conflict.’”36 The Court noted that “the Federal Statute authorizes
national banks to engage in activities that the State Statute expressly forbids,” a situation that
would “ordinarily” result in preemption unless “the Federal Statute grants banks a permission
that is limited to circumstances where state law is not to the contrary.”37 The Court concluded
that Section 92 preempted Florida’s law because there was no indication that Congress
“expressly conditioned the grant of [federal] ‘power’ upon a grant of state permission.”38
The Supreme Court explained in Barnett Bank that the NBA’s “history is one of
interpreting grants of both enumerated and incidental ‘powers’ to national banks as grants of
authority not normally limited by, but rather ordinarily pre-empting, contrary state laws.”39 The
Court held that Florida’s law was preempted because Section 92 “does not condition federal
permission [for the exercise of insurance agency powers] upon that of the State.”40

Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 27-29. Under 12 U.S.C. § 92, national banks that are “located and doing business” in
towns of 5,000 or less may act as insurance agents for insurance companies that are licensed by the relevant state
authorities. In December 1995 (shortly before Barnett Bank was decided), almost 77% of U.S. banks were
subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Bank Holding Companies (Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys.),
https://www.fedpartnership.gov/bank-life-cycle/manage-transition/bank-holding-companies.
36
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 31.
37
Id. at 31-32.
38
Id. at 34.
39
Id. at 32.
40
Id. at 35.
35
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Thus, the Supreme Court’s finding of preemption in Barnett Bank was based on the
Court’s determination that Florida’s statute was “contrary” to federal law because Florida
attempted to “condition[] the grant of ‘power’ [by Section 92] upon a grant of state
permission.”41 Florida’s statute sought to prevent the exercise of a federally-granted power by
national banks if they were subsidiaries of bank holding companies. Because “nearly all U.S.
banking assets are controlled by bank holding companies,”42 the “condition” imposed by Florida
amounted to a near-total prohibition on the exercise of a federally-granted power by national
banks.
The Supreme Court made clear in Barnett Bank that the NBA does not preempt state laws
that regulate the exercise of powers by national banks in a more limited and reasonable manner.
The Court explained:
[N]ormally Congress would not want States to forbid, or to impair significantly,
the exercise of a power that Congress explicitly granted. To say this is not to
deprive the States of the power to regulate national banks, where (unlike here)
doing so does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s
exercise of its powers.43
The Supreme Court established two crucial points in the foregoing passage. First, the
Court affirmed that the states have some authority “to regulate national banks” in the “exercise”
of their “powers.” That statement directly contradicts the Second Circuit’s view that the NBA
preempts every state law that seeks to “exert control over a banking power” granted to national

41

Id. at 32, 34.
Dafna Avraham, Patricia Selvaggi & James Vickery, “A Structural View of U.S. Bank Holding Companies,”
Economic Policy Review (Fed. Res. Bank of NY), July 2012, at 65 (quote), 66 (Chart 1),
https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/12v18n2/1207avra.pdf.
43
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33.
42

9

banks under federal law.44 Second, the Supreme Court used the same standard twice – “to
forbid, or to impair significantly” and “prevent or significantly interfere” – to describe the
magnitude of state interference that results in preemption under the NBA. Accordingly, Barnett
Bank makes clear that state laws regulating national banks are preempted only if they completely
block or “significantly” infringe upon the exercise by national banks of one or more of their
federally-granted powers.
In Barnett Bank,45 the Supreme Court cited three of its previous decisions under the NBA
as supporting precedents for its “prevent or significantly interfere” preemption standard—
National Bank v. Commonwealth,46 McClellan v. Chipman,47 and Anderson National Bank v.
Luckett.48 One year after its decision in Barnett Bank, the Supreme Court again affirmed the
applicability of state laws to national banks in Atherton v. FDIC.49 Justice Breyer, who authored
the Court’s unanimous opinion in Barnett Bank, also wrote the majority opinion in Atherton. In
Atherton, all members of the Court agreed with Justice Breyer’s statements that (i) “in 1870 and
thereafter this Court held that federally chartered banks are subject to state law,” and (ii) “[t]he
Court subsequently found numerous state laws applicable to federally chartered banks.”50 To
support those statements, Atherton cited several Supreme Court precedents, including
Commonwealth and Anderson National Bank as well as First National Bank in St. Louis v.
Missouri.51

44

Cantero, 49 F.4th at 125, 132.
Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33-34.
46
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870) [hereinafter Commonwealth].
47
164 U.S. 347 (1896) [hereinafter McClellan].
48
321 U.S. 233 (1944) [hereinafter Anderson National Bank].
49
519 U.S. 213 (1997) [hereinafter Atherton].
50
Id. at 222, 223 (majority opinion). The three concurring Justices in Atherton agreed with Justice Breyer’s
statements about the applicability of state laws to federally-chartered banks. See id. at 231-32 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“I join all of the Court’s opinion, except to the extent that it
relies on the notably unhelpful legislative history of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k).”).
51
263 U.S. 640 (1924) [hereinafter St. Louis].
45
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In 2007, the Supreme Court reiterated Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere”
preemption standard in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A.,52 where the Court said:
States are permitted to regulate the activities of national banks where doing so
does not prevent or significantly interfere with the national bank’s or the national
bank regulator’s exercise of its powers. But when state prescriptions significantly
impair the exercise of authority, enumerated or incidental under the NBA, the
State’s regulations must give way.53
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C.54 is the Supreme Court’s most recent decision
addressing the topic of preemption under the NBA, but Cantero failed to mention that decision
or consider its relevance. In Cuomo, the Court declared that “States . . . have always enforced
their general laws against national banks—and have enforced their banking-related laws against
national banks for at least 85 years, as evidenced by St. Louis, in which we upheld enforcement
of a state anti-bank branching law,” as well as Anderson National Bank.55 Cuomo struck down
an OCC rule that barred state officials from filing lawsuits to enforce valid state laws against
national banks. The Court held that the OCC’s rule improperly sought to “exempt national banks
from all state banking laws, or at least state enforcement of those laws.”56
The Court pointed out in Cuomo that the “almost categorical prohibition” on state law
enforcement in the OCC’s rule potentially applied to the exercise by national banks of their
“power” to make contracts under the NBA.57 As the Court explained, that outcome would be
contrary to St. Louis, Anderson National Bank, and other judicial decisions that “honor[ed] . . .

52

550 U.S. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Watters].
Watters, 550 U.S. at 12 (citing Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 32-34).
54
557 U.S. 519 (2009) [hereinafter Cuomo].
55
Id. at 534 (citing and discussing St. Louis and Anderson National Bank].
56
Id. at 524-35 (quote at 533) (invalidating a portion of 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)).
57
Id. at 532-33 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Third)).
53
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Congress’s decision not to pre-empt substantive state law.”58 Congress codified Cuomo’s
holding in Section 1047(a) of Dodd-Frank, which provides that a state attorney general may
“bring an action against a national bank in a court of appropriate jurisdiction to enforce an
applicable law and to seek relief as authorized by such law.”59
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero directly conflicts with the “prevent or
significantly interfere” preemption standard established by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank as
well as the Court’s subsequent decisions in Atherton and Cuomo. The Second Circuit
disregarded the plain meaning of Barnett Bank’s preemption standard, holding that the
dispositive question for preemption is “not how much a state law impacts a national bank, but
whether it purports to ‘control’ the exercise of its powers.”60 The Second Circuit also said:
To determine whether the NBA conflicts with a state law, we ask whether
enforcement of the law at issue would exert control over a banking power—and
thus, if taken to the extreme, threaten to ‘destroy’ the grant made by the federal
government. . . . We do not endeavor to assess whether the degree of the state
law’s impact on national banks would be sufficient to undermine that power. 61
The Second Circuit concluded that (i) preemption under the NBA is always justified if a state
law is “usurping control over federally granted powers to a federally created entity,” and (ii) it is
therefore not necessary to show that the state’s “regulation is intrusive in degree or that it
practically abrogates the [national bank’s] power.”62

58

Id. at 527-30, 534-35 (quote at 530).
Dodd-Frank, § 1047(a), 124 Stat. 2018 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(i)(1)); see Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., “The
Dodd-Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services,” 36 Journal of
Corporation Law 893, 941-42 (2011) (explaining that Section 1047(a) of Dodd-Frank “expressly endorses the
Supreme Court’s decision in Cuomo”) [hereinafter Wilmarth, “Dodd-Frank”], available at
https://ssrn.com/abstract=1891970; Senate Report No. 111-176, at 176-77 (2010) (same).
60
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 131 (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 431).
61
Id. at 132 (emphasis added) (citing and quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 431).
62
Id. at 137.
59
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By refusing to consider “whether the degree of the state law’s impact on national banks
would be sufficient to undermine [a national bank’s] power,” or whether the state law is
“intrusive in degree or . . . practically abrogates” a national bank’s power, the Second Circuit
failed to follow the plain meaning of Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere”
preemption standard. The Second Circuit acknowledged that dictionary definitions of the term
“significantly” include “[f]airly large in amount or quantity” or “important” or “meaningful.”63
In decisions interpreting federal securities statutes, the Supreme Court held that the terms
“material” and “significant” are synonyms, and a “material” fact is one that a reasonable investor
would be likely to view as “important.”64
The Supreme Court also equated the terms “significant” and “important” in a 1989
decision interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA requires federal
agencies to file environmental impact statements when they issue proposals that have
“significant” environmental consequences. The Supreme Court explained that “NEPA ensures
that important [environmental] effects will not be overlooked or underestimated only to be
discovered later after resources have been committed or the die otherwise cast.”65

Id. at 136-37; see also the definitions of “significant”—which include “having or likely to have influence or
effect: IMPORTANT” and “of a noticeably or measurably large amount”—in Merriam-Webster.com Dictionary,
Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/significant (accessed Nov. 12, 2022).
64
In Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988), the Court adopted, under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act), a “materiality” standard that requires a plaintiff shareholder to show “a substantial
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having
significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” Id. at 231–32 (1988) (emphasis added) (quoting
TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (establishing the same standard for “materiality” under
Section 14(a) of the 1934 Act)). Basic also held that “[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to vote.” Id. at 231 (emphasis added)
(quoting TSC, 426 U.S. at 449); see also Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1097 (1991)
(holding that “liability under [Section] 14(a) [of the 1934 Act] must rest not only on deceptiveness but on materiality
as well (i.e., it has to be significant enough to be important to a reasonable investor deciding how to vote”)
(emphasis added).
65
Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (emphasis added); see also id. at 348
(quoting NEPA’s requirement that federal agencies must prepare environmental impact statements with respect to
“major” proposals “significantly affecting the quality of the human environment”) (emphasis added).
63
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The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero cannot be harmonized with the Supreme Court’s
interpretations of the terms “significant” and “significantly” or with standard dictionary
definitions of those terms. The Second Circuit clearly erred when it refused to consider the
magnitude and importance of the alleged “interference” created by NYGOL § 5-601 before it
concluded that preemption was justified under Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere”
standard. The Second Circuit disregarded the fact-intensive analysis required by Barnett Bank
and instead adopted a blunt per se rule that always results in preemption under the NBA
whenever a state law seeks to exert any degree of “control” over the exercise of a national bank
power.66 The Second Circuit’s per se rule is untenable and should be rejected by the Supreme
Court because that rule conflicts with the plain meaning of Barnett Bank’s governing preemption
standard.
b. The Second Circuit’s per se preemption rule is contradicted by four Supreme Court
precedents that provided the foundation for Barnett Bank’s preemption standard.
As shown above, the Supreme Court’s decisions in Barnett Bank, Atherton, and Cuomo
relied on four key precedents—Commonwealth, McClellan, St. Louis, and Anderson National
Bank—in developing the modern law of preemption under the NBA.67 Those four decisions
upheld the application of state laws to the exercise of national bank powers because the state
laws in question (i) did not discriminate against national banks, (ii) did not conflict with the
express terms of the NBA or other federal statutes, and (iii) did not impose significant burdens
on national banks or impair their ability to discharge their duties to the federal government. All

See Cantero. 49 F.4th at 125 (stating that NYGOL § 5-601’s “minimum-interest requirement would exert control
over a banking power granted by the federal government, so it would impermissibly interfere with national banks’
exercise of that power. We thus hold that the law is preempted by the [NBA].”) (emphasis added); see also supra
notes 14-15, 24-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Second Circuit’s view of preemption under the NBA).
67
See supra notes 45-51, 54-58 and accompanying text.
66
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four decisions refute the Second Circuit’s view that state laws are always preempted if they
attempt to exert any degree of “control” over the exercise of national bank powers.
In Commonwealth—decided six years after the NBA’s enactment—the Supreme Court
upheld a Kentucky law that required national and state banks to pay, on behalf of their
shareholders, the state’s tax on bank shares. The Supreme Court noted that “[i]t has been the
practice of many of the States for a long time to require of its corporations, thus to pay the tax
levied on their shareholders.”68 The Court also pointed out that Kentucky “could undoubtedly
collect [its bank shares tax] by legal proceeding, in which the bank could be attached or
garnisheed, and made to pay the debt out of the means of its shareholder under its control.”69
Accordingly, Kentucky’s law created “no greater interference with the functions of the [national]
bank than any other legal proceeding to which its business operations may subject it.”70
A national bank challenged the Kentucky statute. The bank argued, based on McCulloch,
that national banks, “being instrumentalities of the federal government, by which some of its
most important operations are conducted, cannot be submitted to such State legislation.”71 As
discussed below, prior to the creation of the Federal Reserve System in 1913, national banks
performed important public functions for the federal government.72 The Supreme Court
determined in Commonwealth that the Kentucky statute “in no manner hinders [the national
bank] from performing all the duties of financial agent of the [federal] government.”73
Commonwealth also distinguished McCulloch, explaining that the “principle” established
in McCulloch
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has its foundation in the proposition, that the right of taxation may be so used in
such cases as to destroy the instrumentalities by which the [federal] government
proposes to effect its lawful purposes in the States, and it certainly cannot be
maintained that banks or other corporations or instrumentalities of the [federal]
government are to be wholly withdrawn from the operation of State legislation. . .
. [T]he agencies of the Federal government are only exempted from State
legislation, so far as that legislation may interfere with, or impair their efficiency
in performing the functions by which they are designed to serve the government. 74
In Atherton, the Supreme Court reiterated the distinction it drew in Commonwealth, stating that
Commonwealth “distinguished McCulloch by recalling that Maryland’s taxes were ‘used . . . to
destroy’” the Second Bank of the United States.75
Commonwealth further explained that the “principle” of McCulloch was “founded alone
in the necessity of securing to the government of the United States the means of exercising its
legitimate powers.”76 Commonwealth rejected any broader rule for national banks that would
“convert” McCulloch’s principle “into an unauthorized and unjustifiable invasion of the rights of
the States.”77 The Supreme Court therefore held in Commonwealth that national banks
are subject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course of
business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation. All their contracts
are governed and construed by State laws. Their acquisition and transfer of
property, their right to collect their debts, and their liability to be sued for debts,
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76
Commonwealth, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 362.
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are all based on State law. It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks
from discharging their duties to the [federal] government that it becomes
unconstitutional.78
Commonwealth thus made clear that “federally chartered banks are subject to state law,”
as the Supreme Court affirmed in Atherton.79 The original NBA (like the current statute)
expressly empowered national banks to make contracts, to sue and be sued, and to acquire, own,
and transfer real property.80 The foregoing passage from Commonwealth (which Atherton
quoted in full) clearly establishes—contrary to the Second Circuit’s view—that the NBA allows
states to regulate the exercise of “powers” granted to national banks by federal law.
In McClellan, the Supreme Court upheld the application to national banks of a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited creditors from receiving preferential transfers of assets
from insolvent debtors. A national bank challenged the Massachusetts law, contending that it
would “tend to impair” the express powers of national banks to make contracts and to accept
transfers of real property either as security for debts previously contracted or in satisfaction of
those debts.81 The Supreme Court observed that the national bank’s argument “amounts to the
assertion that national banks in virtue of the act of Congress are entirely removed, as to all of
their contracts, from any and every control by the state law.”82 The Court rejected that argument
and held that the powers of national banks to make contracts and accept transfers of real estate
were subject to the limitations imposed by the Massachusetts statute. 83
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After reviewing its prior decisions in Commonwealth and Davis v. Elmira Savings
Bank,84 the Supreme Court explained in McClellan that those decisions established
a rule and an exception, the rule being the operation of general state laws upon the
dealings and contracts of national banks, the exception being the cessation of the
operation of such laws whenever they expressly conflict with the laws of the
United States or frustrate the purpose for which the national banks were created,
or impair their efficiency to discharge the duties imposed on them by the law of
the United States.85
Based on the foregoing “rule,” McClellan rejected the national bank’s claim that “in
every case where a national bank is empowered to make a contract, such contract is not subject
to the state law.”86 The Supreme Court determined that there was “no conflict between the
special power conferred by Congress upon national banks to take real estate for certain purposes,
and the general and undiscriminating law of the State of Massachusetts subjecting the taking of
real estate to certain restrictions, in order to prevent preferences in case of insolvency.” 87 The
Court also concluded that “[n]o function of [national] banks is destroyed or hampered by
allowing the banks to exercise the power to take real estate, provided only they do so under the
same conditions and restrictions to which all the other citizens of the State are subjected.” 88
In St. Louis, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a Missouri statute that prohibited
state and national banks from opening branches in the state. A national bank challenged the
statute, claiming that “[a] state statute attempting to limit or define the powers of a national bank
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is invalid.”89 The Supreme Court rejected that claim based on the “rule” it established in
McClellan, holding that “national banks are subject to the laws of a State in respect of their
affairs unless such laws interfere with the purposes of their creation, tend to impair or destroy
their efficiency as federal agencies or conflict with the paramount law of the United States.”90
The Court determined that Missouri’s anti-branching statute did not conflict with the NBA (as
the NBA did not authorize national banks to establish branches in 1924), and it also did not
“frustrate the purpose for which the [national] bank was created or interfere with the discharge of
its duties to the [federal] government or impair its efficiency as a federal agency.” 91
In Anderson National Bank, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a Kentucky statute
that required banks to transfer to state authorities deposit accounts that were inactive for ten
years (for demand deposits) or twenty-five years (for other types of deposits). The Kentucky
statute provided owners of transferred deposits with notice and an opportunity for hearing, and
transferred deposits were not escheated (i.e., forfeited) to the state unless state authorities proved
in judicial proceedings that those deposits had been abandoned. A national bank challenged the
Kentucky statute, claiming that it violated the due process rights of the bank and its depositors
and also “infringe[d] the national banking laws, particularly [Rev. Stat.] § 5136, 12 U.S.C. § 24,
which authorize national banks to accept deposits and to do a banking business.”92
The Supreme Court rejected the national bank’s challenge, finding that the Kentucky
statute “does not deprive [the bank] or its depositors of property without due process of law” and
did not create any conflict with the NBA.93 The Court found that Kentucky’s statute “does not
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discriminate against national banks,” as it applied equally to national and state banks. The state
law also did not conflict with either the express or implied terms of the NBA.94
Citing St. Louis and other decisions, Anderson National Bank declared, “This Court has
often pointed out that national banks are subject to state laws, unless those laws infringe the
national banking laws or impose an undue burden on the performance of the bank’s functions.”95
Accordingly, “[t]he mere fact that the depositor’s account is in a national bank does not render it
immune to attachment by the creditors of the depositor, as authorized by state law.” A bank
deposit “is a part of the mass of property within the state whose transfer and devolution is subject
to state control. . . . It has never been suggested that non-discriminatory laws of this type are so
burdensome as to be inapplicable to the accounts of depositors in national banks.”96
The appellant national bank in Anderson National Bank invoked the Supreme Court’s
previous decision in First National Bank of San Jose v. California.97 The appellant bank argued
that “if the [Kentucky statute] is sustained, it will open the door to the exercise of unlimited state
discretionary power over the deposits in national banks.”98 The appellant bank’s argument
closely resembled the Second Circuit’s conclusion (based on San Jose) that “state laws
exercising control over national banks—even if their own practical effect may be minimal—are
invalid if, when aggregated with similar laws of other states, they would threaten to undermine a
federal banking power.”99
The Supreme Court rejected the appellant bank’s parade-of-horribles argument in
Anderson National Bank, stating that
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[T]he state’s power to [require transfers of dormant deposit accounts] cannot
extend beyond its power under state law and the Federal Constitution to acquire
control of deposit accounts from their owners. So long as it is thus limited, and
the power is exercised only to demand payment of the accounts in the same way
and to the same extent that the depositors could, we can perceive no danger of
unlimited control by the state over the operations of national banking
institutions.100
The Court also explained in Anderson National Bank that its previous decision in San
Jose was based “on the effect of the state statute in altering the contracts of deposit in a manner
considered so unusual and so harsh in its application to depositors as to deter them from placing
or keeping their funds in national banks.”101 The California statute at issue in San Jose provided
that all deposits that remained inactive for more than twenty years would be escheated to the
state based on “mere dormancy,” without notice or opportunity for hearing and without “proof
that the forfeited accounts had been in fact abandoned.”102 The California statute’s “unusual
alteration of depositors’ accounts” was tantamount to a threatened “‘confiscation’ of depositors’
accounts,” thereby creating “an effective deterrent to depositors’ placing their funds in national
banks doing business within the state.”103
In contrast, the Kentucky law upheld in Anderson National Bank did not authorize
“escheat or forfeiture for mere dormancy,” as it required state officials to establish “proof of
abandonment” in judicial proceedings after giving notice to affected banks and depositors. In
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view of those procedural protections, the Supreme Court determined that Kentucky’s statute
would not “deter [depositors] from placing their funds in national banks” in Kentucky to any
greater degree than “the tax laws, the attachment laws, or the laws for the administration of
estates of decedents or of missing or unknown persons, which a state may maintain and apply to
depositors in national banks.”104 The Court concluded that Kentucky’s statute resulted in “no
denial of constitutional right and no unlawful encroachment on the rights and privileges of
national banks.”105
Thus, Commonwealth, McClellan, St. Louis, and Anderson National Bank upheld state
laws that imposed nondiscriminatory and reasonable regulations on the exercise of national bank
powers, including the powers to make contracts, acquire real property, and accept deposits. All
four decisions sustained the validity of state laws that did not prohibit or significantly burden the
exercise of national bank powers. In each of those decisions, the Supreme Court performed a
detailed, fact-intensive inquiry regarding the practical effects of the challenged state law, and
Anderson National Bank rejected a parade-of-horribles argument similar to the preemption
analysis adopted by the Second Circuit. Those four key precedents provided the foundation for
modern preemption law under the NBA, including Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly
interfere” preemption standard. The same precedents—together with Barnett Bank, Atherton,
and Cuomo—refute the Second Circuit’s assertion that its per se preemption rule is supported by
“an unbroken line of [Supreme Court] case law since McCulloch.”106
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c. The Second Circuit’s per se preemption rule contravenes the “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard codified by Congress in the DoddFrank Act.
In 2010, Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act “in response to a ‘financial crisis that
nearly crippled the U.S. economy.’”107 Congress determined that “a major cause of the most
calamitous worldwide recession since the Great Depression was the simple failure of federal
regulators to stop abusive lending, particularly unsustainable home mortgage lending.”108
Congress concluded that “it was the failure by the prudential regulators to give sufficient
consideration to consumer protection that helped bring the financial system down.”109
Congress also found that, after “federal regulators refused to act, the states stepped into
the breach” by enacting laws designed to prevent “the devastating results of predatory mortgage
lending.” However, “rather than supporting [state] anti-predatory lending laws, federal
regulators preempted them.”110 In particular, “[t]he OCC promulgated a rule in 2004 that . . .
exempted all national banks from State lending laws, including the anti-predatory lending
laws.”111 The OCC’s 2004 rule asserted that state lending laws were preempted if they “obstruct,
impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise” its federally-authorized lending
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powers.112 Congress determined that the OCC’s preemption rule “actively created an
environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish without State controls.”113
In Title X of Dodd-Frank, Congress “addressed the framework of NBA preemption
determinations” and “aimed to undo broad preemption determinations, which it believed planted
the seeds ‘for long-term trouble in the national banking system.’”114 Section 1044 of DoddFrank amended the NBA “to clarify the preemption standard relating to State consumer financial
laws as applied to national banks.”115 Under Section 1044, “[t]he standard for preempting State
consumer financial laws would return to what it had been for decades, those recognized by the
Supreme Court in Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (Barnett), undoing broader
standards adopted by rules, orders, and interpretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”116
Section 1044 of Dodd-Frank—codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)—provides that “State
consumer financial laws are preempted, only if” one of the following three circumstances is
present: (A) “application of a State consumer financial law would have a discriminatory effect on
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national banks, in comparison with” that law’s impact on state banks; or (B) “in accordance with
the legal standard for preemption in the decision of the Supreme Court [in Barnett Bank], the
State consumer financial law prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national
bank of its powers;” or (C) “the State consumer financial law is preempted by a provision of
Federal law other than [the NBA].”117 Section 25b also imposes several substantive and
procedural limitations on the OCC’s authority to issue rules or orders determining that federal
law preempts state consumer financial laws.118
In Cantero, the Second Circuit held that Section 25b(b)(1)(B) preempted the application
of NYGOL § 5-601 to national banks. The Second Circuit did not rely on the preemption
provisions contained in either Section 25b(b)(1)(A) or (C).119 The Second Circuit recognized
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that Section 25b(b)(1)(B) “expressly codifies” Barnett Bank’s “prevents or significantly
interferes” preemption standard as the governing rule for determining whether the NBA
preempts a nondiscriminatory state consumer financial law.120 As the Ninth Circuit pointed out
in Lusnak, Section 25b(b)(1)(B) provides that a state consumer financial law is preempted by the
NBA “only if it ‘prevents or significantly interferes with the exercise by the national bank of its
powers.’”121 Congress also emphasized that its codification of Barnett Bank’s “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B) was specifically intended to
“undo[] broader standards adopted . . . by the OCC in 2004.”122
In Lusnak, the Ninth Circuit criticized the OCC for refusing to adopt Barnett Bank’s
“prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard when the OCC issued its preemption

as other national bank activities. Senate Report No. 111-176, at 16-17, 175 (2010) (quote at 175); see also supra
notes 108-17 and accompanying text.
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rules in 2004 and modified those rules in 2011.123 The OCC’s refusal to include Barnett Bank’s
“prevents or significantly interferes” standard in its 2011 preemption rules was particularly
egregious in view of Congress’s decision to codify that standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B)) when it
passed the Dodd-Frank Act in 2010.124
In striking contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Second Circuit did not criticize the OCC and
instead stated in Cantero that its “conclusion” about preemption was “consistent” with the
OCC’s 2004 and 2011 rules.125 As shown above, the Second Circuit’s view of preemption
would preempt all state laws that “exert control over a banking power granted by the federal
government,” or that “target, curtail, and hinder” such a power.126 The Second Circuit’s per se
preemption benchmark would have the same practical effect as the OCC’s 2004 preemption
rules, which sought to preempt all state laws that “obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s
ability to fully exercise” its federally-authorized powers.127
The Second Circuit’s erroneous view of preemption—like the OCC’s deeply flawed
rules—directly conflicts with the “prevents or significant interferes” preemption standard
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that standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B). In defiance of Congress’s explicit mandate, the OCC asserted that ‘the DoddFrank Act does not create a new stand-alone ‘prevents or significantly interferes’ preemption standard.’”) (quoting
“Office of Thrift Supervision Integration; Dodd-Frank Act Implementation,” 76 Fed. Reg. 43549, 43555 (July 21,
2011)).
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Cantero, 49 F.4th at 135; see also id. (evidently agreeing with the OCC’s view that Barnett Bank contains
“different linguistic formations” about preemption).
126
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established by Barnett Bank and codified in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).128 The unambiguous terms of
Section 25b(b)(1)(B) permit “State consumer financial laws” to regulate the “exercise” of
“powers” by national banks and provides that those state laws are preempted “only if” they
violate Barnett Bank’s “prevents or significantly interferes” standard. Section 25b(a)(2) defines
“State consumer financial law” to include any state law “that does not directly or indirectly
discriminate against national banks and that directly and specifically relates to the manner,
content, or terms and conditions of any financial transactions (as may be authorized for national
banks to engage in), or any account related thereto, with respect to a consumer.”129
The references in Section 25b(a)(2) to “financial transactions” that “may be authorized
for national banks to engage in” clearly include deposits, loans, and other financial services that
national banks provide to consumers under their federally-granted powers.130 The Second
Circuit’s assertion that the NBA preempts all state laws that “exert control over a banking power
granted by the federal government” contravenes the plain meaning of “State consumer financial
law” as defined in Sections 25b(a)(2) as well as the “prevents or significantly interferes”
preemption standard codified in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero also frustrates the manifest purpose of
Congress when it codified Barnett Bank’s preemption standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B). As
shown above, Congress criticized and repudiated the OCC’s expansive 2004 preemption rules—
whose scope was similar to the Second Circuit’s per se preemption benchmark—because (i) the
OCC’s rules had a “broader” preemptive impact on state consumer financial laws than Barnett
Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere” preemption standard, and (ii) the OCC’s rules
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See supra notes 43-45, 61-66, 111-27 and accompanying text.
Dodd-Frank, § 1044, 124 Stat. 2014-15 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b(a)(2)).
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See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 (Third), 24 (Seventh) & 371.
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undermined efforts by many states to enact and enforce laws that would protect their residents
from abusive and predatory mortgage lending by national banks. 131
Notwithstanding the plain meaning and clear purpose of Section 25b(b)(1)(B), the
Second Circuit declared that “Plaintiffs’ focus on the words ‘significantly interferes’ in isolation
is misguided because ‘the language of an opinion is not always to be parsed as though we were
reading [the] language of a statute.’”132 The Second Circuit evidently believed that it could
peruse the entire opinion in Barnett Bank as well as other Supreme Court opinions and use
selected quotations from those opinions to support a per se preemption rule that is far broader
than the “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard that Congress chose to codify
in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).
The Second Circuit’s refusal to apply the plain meaning of Section 25b(b)(1)(B) is
indefensible in view of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Brown v. Davenport.133 In
Brown, the Supreme Court instructed federal courts that they must follow the clear mandate of a
federal statute and may not evade Congress’s command by relying on inconsistent language
drawn from previous Supreme Court opinions.
Brown reversed a decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which granted a petition
for habeas corpus filed by a convicted criminal defendant. The Sixth Circuit held that the
defendant was entitled to habeas relief under the Supreme Court’s decision in Brecht v.
Abramson.134 The Sixth Circuit also concluded that it did not need to determine whether the
requested habeas relief complied with a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which was enacted
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See supra notes 110-17, 122 and accompanying text.
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 136 (quoting Brown v. Davenport, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1528 (2022) (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 341 (1979)). The quoted statement from Brown v. Davenport obviously does not support the
Second Circuit’s refusal to apply the plain meaning of a crucial term (“significantly interferes”) codified in a federal
statute (12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B)).
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142 S. Ct. 1510 (2022) [hereinafter Brown].
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after Brecht. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit’s decision, declaring that “[w]hen
Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision, federal courts must follow it.”135 The
Supreme Court further held that “a federal court cannot grant [habeas] relief without first
applying both the test this Court outlined in Brecht and the one Congress prescribed in [Section
2254(d)].”136
The defendant in Brown attempted to evade the requirements of Section 2254(d) by
relying on two Supreme Court decisions that interpreted Brecht: Fry v. Pliler137 and Davis v.
Ayala.138 The defendant asserted that certain statements in those decisions allowed federal courts
to “override a lawful congressional command—that no federal habeas relief should issue ‘unless’
[Section 2254(d)]'s applicable conditions are satisfied.”139 The Supreme Court firmly rejected
that argument, holding that federal courts cannot ignore or avoid Section 2254(d)’s mandate “on
the basis of a handful of sentences extracted from decisions that had no reason to pass on the
argument [the defendant] presents today.”140 In a subsequent habeas case,141 the Supreme Court
reiterated that “we lack authority to amend [Section 2254’s] clear text.”142
Like the defendant’s argument in Brown, the Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero
improperly relied on language “extracted” from various Supreme Court decisions to “override a
lawful congressional command” contained in a federal statute.143 As shown in the next section
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140
Id.
141
Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022).
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Brown, 142 S. Ct. at 1528; see Cantero, 49 F.4th at 131 (stating that “the Supreme Court has used various
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Court’s previous decisions support the view that “the question is not how much a state law impacts a national bank,
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of this article, all of the Supreme Court opinions cited by the Second Circuit were issued before
Congress passed the Dodd-Frank Act, and any inconsistent reasoning in those opinions has been
superseded by the “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard that Congress
codified in Section 25b(b)(1)(B). Brown makes clear that “federal courts must follow” the plain
meaning of Congress’s chosen preemption standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).144
3. Cantero’s erroneous per se preemption rule relies on judicial decisions that do not
apply to present-day national banks and have been superseded by Congress’s
codification of Barnett Bank’s “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption
standard.
The Supreme Court decisions cited by the Second Circuit do not support the per se
preemption rule it adopted in Cantero. Most of those decisions were issued many years ago,
involved very different historical circumstances, and dealt with federally-chartered institutions
that were not comparable to today’s national banks. Some of those decisions are distinguishable
on their facts, and all of them were decided prior to Congress’s enactment of Section
25b(b)(1)(B) in 2010. Thus, all of the decisions relied upon by the Second Circuit have been
superseded by Congress’s decision to codify Barnett Bank’s “prevents or significantly interferes”
preemption standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).
a. McCulloch and Osborn
The Second Circuit relied heavily on McCulloch to support its conclusion that
the NBA preempted NYGOL § 5-601. Citing McCulloch, the Second Circuit held that the New
York statute could not be applied to national banks because it “would exert control over a
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banking power granted by the federal government.”145 The Second Circuit also cited Osborn v.
Bank of the United States146 for the proposition that the NBA “exempts the trade of the [banks] . .
. from the control of the States.”147 A careful analysis of the historical background of McCulloch
and Osborn and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in those cases demonstrates that neither decision
applies to modern national banks.
McCulloch and Osborn struck down Maryland and Ohio laws that imposed taxes on the
Second Bank of the United States. The Second Bank was a government-sponsored enterprise
that performed functions of great importance to the federal government. The federal government
owned a fifth of the Second Bank’s stock and appointed a fifth of the Second Bank’s directors.
The Second Bank served as the depositary and fiscal agent of the federal government. In
addition, the Second Bank (i) created a national currency by issuing its own bank notes, which
had the status of legal tender under federal law and accounted for about a quarter of all notes
issued by U.S. banks, and (ii) controlled the volume of the nation’s outstanding paper currency
by deciding whether to require state banks to redeem their notes in specie. Nicholas Biddle, who
served as the Second Bank’s president from 1823 until the Bank’s demise in 1836, adopted

Cantero, 49 F.4th at 125 (citing McCulloch); see also id. at 131 (citing McCulloch for the proposition that “the
question is not how much a state law impacts a national bank, but rather whether it purports to ‘control’ the exercise
of its powers”); id. at 134-35 (citing McCulloch to support the view that “[t]he power to set minimum rates [in
NYGOL § 5-601] is the ‘power to control,’ and the power to control is the ‘power to destroy.’”).
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22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) [hereinafter Osborn].
147
Cantero, 49 F.4th at 132 (quoting, with significant modifications, Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 866). The full
text of the passage from Osborn quoted by the Second Circuit reads as follows: “[T]the sound construction of the act
[chartering the Second Bank of the United States is] that it exempts the trade of the Bank, as being essential to the
character of a machine necessary to the fiscal operations of the government, from the control of the States.”
Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 866 (emphasis added). The Second Circuit omitted the clause shown in italics from
its truncated quotation. As the omitted clause clearly indicates, the Supreme Court based its decision in Osborn on
its finding of an “essential” connection between the Second Bank’s private banking “trade” and the Second Bank’s
public functions as “a machine necessary to the fiscal operations of the [federal] government.” For further
discussion of the Supreme Court’s emphasis in Osborn on the “essential” connection between the Second Bank’s
private activities and public functions, see infra notes 161-71 and accompanying text. The “essential” connection
that existed between the Second Bank’s private and public operations does not exist in present-day national banks
because they do not perform any important public functions for the federal government. See infra notes 166-75,
183-89, 193 and accompanying text.
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policies that made the Second Bank “a central bank with effective power over the nation’s
money market.”148
Chief Justice John Marshall issued the Court’s unanimous opinion in McCulloch.
Marshall described the Second Bank as “a convenient, a useful, and essential instrument [of the
federal government] in the prosecution of its fiscal operations.”149 Marshall declared that the
Constitution prohibited Maryland from taxing the Second Bank because the Bank was an
“instrument, employed by the [federal] government in the execution of its powers.”150 As
Marshall explained, if the states could tax the Second Bank, “they may tax any and every other
instrument” of the federal government, including the mint, the post office, customs houses, and
federal courts, thereby “defeat[ing] all the ends of government.”151 Thus, Marshall based the
Court’s opinion in McCulloch on the Second Bank’s status as an “essential instrument” of the
federal government in conducting its fiscal operations and implementing its financial policies.
McCulloch provided the foundation for the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which
prohibits the states from “interfering with or controlling the operations of the Federal
Government.”152 That doctrine, as currently applied by the Supreme Court, invalidates “state
laws that either ‘regulat[e] the United States directly or discriminat[e] against the Federal
Government or those with whom it deals’ (e.g., contractors).”153 The intergovernmental
immunity doctrine clearly does not apply to NYGOL § 5-601 because that statute does not
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regulate the United States or discriminate against the federal government or its contractors. The
New York statute applies equally to all mortgage lenders that are “located” in New York, and
BofA was acting solely in its private capacity—not as a federal contractor—when BofA
established and administered mortgage escrow accounts for the Cantero Plaintiffs and Hymes
Plaintiffs.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch was highly controversial and provoked a
“barrage of criticism.”154 The strongest opposition to McCulloch occurred in Ohio. Ohio’s state
legislature imposed a punitive tax on the Second Bank’s branches in the state. Ralph Osborn, the
state’s auditor, ordered state officials to collect that tax by seizing assets from the Second Bank’s
branches. The Second Bank sued those officials and obtained an injunction from the federal
circuit court in Ohio. The Osborn case proceeded to the Supreme Court, where Marshall and his
colleagues again considered the question of whether the Second Bank was exempt from state
taxation as an “instrument” of the federal government. 155
Charles Hammond, representing the Ohio officials, focused much of his argument in
Osborn on the Second Bank’s predominant ownership by private individuals and the Second
Bank’s private lending and other commercial banking activities that benefited its private
shareholders. Chief Justice Marshall did not address those features of the Second Bank in his
opinion in McCulloch.156 Hammond maintained that the Second Bank was primarily a “private

Ellis, supra note 148, at 107. Marshall’s conclusions and reasoning in McCulloch were publicly challenged by
numerous commentators and political figures and by several state legislatures. Marshall wrote two series of
newspapers essays (published under pseudonyms) to defend his opinion in McCulloch against vigorous attacks by
two leading Virginia state court judges, William Brockenbrough and Spencer Roane. Id. at 107-43, 156-67, 185-88,
193-202.
155
Id. at 6-8, 143-69.
156
Id. at 4-5, 74-75, 86-88 (stating that Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch “ignored” the Second Bank’s “essentially
privately controlled and profit-making characteristics” despite references to those features in the argument presented
by Walter Jones, counsel for Maryland); id. at 170-74 (discussing Hammond’s argument in Osborn); see also
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 364-65 (quoting Jones’ argument that the Second Bank was “a commercial
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34

concern” and could not be classified as an “agency” or “public office” or “instrument” of the
federal government.157 Hammond contended that Marshall was mistaken in McCulloch when he
compared the Second Bank to the mint and the post office. Unlike the Second Bank, each of
those entities was a “public institution” that was owned entirely by the federal government and
“created purely for public purposes.”158
Hammond acknowledged that the Second Bank would be a “public corporation” if it
were “created by the [federal] government for its own uses” and if its stock were “exclusively
owned” by the federal government. Hammond argued, however, that the Second Bank was not a
“public corporation” or an “instrument of the government” because (i) the great majority of the
Bank’s stock was owned by private individuals, (ii) “private trade” was “the principal, if not the
sole object” of the Bank, and (iii) the Bank’s “public business” was “subordinate and incidental,
and . . . in reality, a very essential means of promoting [the Bank’s] private gain.”159 The fact
that Congress issued a federal charter to the Second Bank was not enough to transform the
Second Bank into a “public corporation” or an “instrument” of the United States that was exempt
from state taxation.160
In his majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall
responded directly to Hammond’s arguments. Marshall admitted that the Second Bank “would

institution, a partnership, incorporated for the purpose of carrying on the trade of banking,” and constituted a “great
banking corporation, branching out into every district of the country”).
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Ellis, supra note 148, at 170-74 (summarizing and quoting Hammond’s argument); see also Osborn, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) at 765-67, 774-77, 785-86 (quoting Hammond’s argument).
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Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 774-75, 784-89 (quoting Hammond’s argument); see also Ellis, supra note 148, at
170-74 (summarizing and quoting Hammond’s argument).
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Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 765-70, 774-75, 778-80, 784-85, 788 (quoting Hammond’s argument); see also id.
at 790 (quoting Hammond’s claim that “the persons who compose [the Second Bank] are not public officers; that the
business it pursues is not a public business, and that its agency for the government is that of a private individual:
from none of which it can derive any exemption not common to private corporations”).
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Id. at 767-84, 790-95 (quoting Hammond’s argument); see also Ellis, supra note 148, at 173-74 (summarizing
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certainly be subject to the taxing power of the State” if the Bank were a “mere private
corporation, engaged in its own business,” and “having private trade and private profit for its
great end and principal object.”161 Marshall also conceded that the Second Bank’s federal
charter was not sufficient by itself to “exempt[] its operations from the action of State
authority.”162 Marshall’s concessions did not matter because he concluded that “[t]he Bank is
not considered as a private corporation, whose principal object is individual trade and individual
profit; but as a public corporation, created for public and national purposes.”163 He declared that
the Second Bank was exempt from state taxation as “the great instrument by which the fiscal
operations of the government are effected.”164
Thus, Marshall’s opinion in Osborn drew a sharp distinction between (i) the public
functions conducted by the Second Bank on behalf of the federal government and (ii) “the mere
business of banking [that] is, in its own nature, a private business, and may be carried on by
individuals or companies having no political connexion with the government.”165 Marshall
acknowledged that the Second Bank was “transacting private as well as public business” by
“lending and dealing in money.”166 However, Marshall maintained that the private activities of
the Second Bank were “inseparably connected” to its “public functions” because the Bank’s
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private business gave “value to the currency in which all transactions of the [federal] government
are conducted.”167
In sum, the fundamental premise of Marshall’s majority opinion in Osborn was that the
Second Bank’s “capacity of carrying on the trade of banking” was “essential to its character, as a
machine for the fiscal operations of the government.”168 Marshall determined that “without [the
Second Bank’s] capacity to trade with individuals, the Bank would be a very defective
instrument, when considered with a single view to its fitness for the purposes of government. On
this point the whole argument rests.”169 Given the “essential” connection between the Second
Bank’s “trade of banking” and its public functions “as a machine for the fiscal operations of the
government,” Marshall concluded that the Bank’s “trade must be as exempt from State control as
the actual conveyance of the public money.”170 Osborn reaffirmed the Supreme Court’s prior
decision in McCulloch based on the Court’s determination that a “necessary” link existed
between the Second Bank’s private business and the Bank’s ability to serve as a “fit instrument
for the [public] objects for which it was created.”171
Marshall’s reasoning in Osborn makes clear that the preemptive immunity granted to the
Second Bank of the United States by McCulloch and Osborn does not apply to modern national
banks. Modern national banks are far different institutions from the Second Bank. Today’s
national banks are privately-owned financial corporations that engage in commercial banking
activities and produce profits for the benefit of their private shareholders. The federal
government does not own stock in national banks and does not appoint their directors or officers.

167

Id. at 863.
Id. at 867.
169
Id. at 865 (emphasis added).
170
Id. at 865, 867.
171
Id. at 867-68.
168

37

National banks do not perform any fiscal or depositary functions for the federal government that
are not provided on equal terms by FDIC-insured state banks.172 Since the enactment of the
Federal Reserve Act (“FRA”) in 1913,173 the Federal Reserve System (Fed) has performed all
monetary and central banking functions for the nation and has acted as the federal government’s
fiscal and financing agent. As discussed below, the FRA ended the public functions that national
banks previously performed for the federal government under the original NBA by issuing a
national currency and purchasing bonds to help finance the federal government’s operations.174
It is therefore clear that present-day national banks are not public institutions comparable
to the Second Bank of the United States. Modern national banks do not serve as “machine[s]
necessary to the fiscal operations of the [federal] government,” and their private “trade of
banking” is not “essential” to the federal government’s ability to perform its public functions and
responsibilities.175 The preemptive immunity granted by McCulloch and Osborn to the Second
Bank of the United States does not support the Second Circuit’s erroneous per se preemption
rule for modern national banks.
b. Dearing and Easton
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero also relied heavily on two Supreme Court
opinions dealing with preemption under the original NBA—Farmers’ & Mechanics National
Bank v. Dearing176 and Easton v. Iowa.177 In Dearing, an 1875 decision, the Supreme Court
declared that “the States can exercise no control over [national banks], nor in any wise affect
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their operation, except in so far as Congress may see proper to permit.”178 In Easton, a 1903
decision, the Court similarly opined that the “operations [of national banks] cannot be limited or
controlled by state legislation.”179
The Supreme Court based its broad view of preemption in Dearing and Easton on the
authority of McCulloch and Osborn. Dearing held that “[t]he constitutionality of the [NBA] of
1864 . . . rests on the same principle as the act creating the second bank of the United States”
because “[t]he national banks organized under the [NBA] are instruments designed to be used to
aid the government in the administration of an important branch of the public service.”180 Easton
affirmed that “[t]he principles enunciated in [McCulloch and Osborn], though expressed in
respect to banks incorporated directly by acts of Congress, are yet applicable to the later and
present system of national banks.”181 Easton also quoted a passage from Osborn in which Chief
Justice Marshall described the Second Bank as a “public corporation created for public and
national purposes.”182
Dearing and Easton applied the sweeping preemption doctrine of McCulloch and Osborn
based on the Supreme Court’s determination that national banks chartered under the original
NBA—like the Second Bank of the United States—were “public corporations” and
“instruments” of the federal government conducting public functions of great importance.183 The
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original NBA—enacted in 1863 and modified in 1864—required national banks to issue national
bank notes and purchase U.S. government bonds to provide financial backing for those notes.
Congress wanted to establish a uniform paper currency consisting of national bank notes and
U.S. government notes (popularly known as “greenbacks”). Congress expected that national
banks would buy large volumes of U.S. government bonds to back their bank notes, thereby
supporting the federal government’s massive funding operations during the Civil War. In 1865,
Congress imposed a punitive 10% tax on state bank notes to drive those notes out of existence
and ensure that national banks would have the exclusive privilege of issuing paper currency in
the form of bank notes.184
National banks lost their roles as issuers of the nation’s paper currency and as leading
funders of the federal government’s operations after Congress passed the FRA in 1913. The
FRA empowered the Fed to issue the nation’s paper currency (in the form of Federal Reserve
notes), to regulate the nation’s money supply, to serve as the federal government’s fiscal agent,
and to support the federal government’s funding activities through the sale of government
securities. The FRA phased out the use of national bank notes by 1935. As a consequence of the
FRA, present-day national banks do not fulfill any of the public functions that were performed

Lev Menand & Morgan Ricks, “Federal Corporate Law and the Business of Banking,” 88 University of Chicago
Law Review 1361, 1389 (2021) (quoting Cong. Globe, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1894 (1864) (remarks of Sen. Sumner)).
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U.S. government bonds); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 549 (1869) (affirming the validity of
Congress’s 1865 tax on state bank notes because Congress, having undertaken “in the exercise of its undisputed
constitutional powers, . . . to provide a currency for the whole country, . . . may, constitutionally, secure the benefit
of it to the people by appropriate legislation. To this end, Congress . . . may restrain, by suitable enactments, the
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by the Second Bank of the United States or by the system of national banks established under the
original NBA.185
In First Agricultural National Bank, decided in 1968, three dissenting Justices argued
that modern national banks should no longer be treated as “tax-immune federal
instrumentalit[ies],” in view of their status as privately-owned, profit-seeking corporations that
do not perform any special public functions for the federal government. The dissenters
explained:
[A] national bank [today] cannot be considered a tax-immune federal
instrumentality. It is a privately owned corporation existing for the private profit
of its shareholders. It performs no significant federal governmental function that
is not performed equally by state-chartered banks. Government officials do not
run its day-to-day operations nor does the Government have any ownership
interest in a national bank.
. . . [T]he fact that [national banks] ‘owe their existence to,’ i.e., are chartered by,
the [federal] Government, has been definitively rejected as a basis alone for
determining that they should be tax immune. . . . Similarly, a whole host of
businesses and institutions are subject to extensive federal regulation and that has
never been thought to bring them within the scope of the ‘federal
instrumentalities’ doctrine.186
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First Agricultural National Bank, 392 U.S. at 356-58 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also House of
Representatives Report No. 63-69, at 16-19, 22-29 (1913) (explaining that the FRA would phase out the use of
national bank notes and establish the Fed as the sole issuer of the nation’s paper currency and as regulator of the
nation’s money supply); The Fed Explained: What the Central Bank Does 20-44, 98-104 (Bd. of Governors of Fed.
Res. Sys., 11th ed. Aug. 2021) (describing the Fed’s functions under the FRA),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/files/the-fed-explained.pdf; Studenski & Krooss, supra note 148, at
257-61 (same).
186
First Agricultural National Bank, 392 U.S. at 354-55 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted); see also id. at
358 (“Today the national banks perform no significant fiscal services to the Federal Government not performed by

41

The majority opinion in First Agricultural National Bank held that the application of
Massachusetts’ sales and use taxes to national banks was preempted by 12 U.S.C. § 548. As of
1968, Section 548 allowed states to tax national banks in four specified areas but did not
authorize states to impose sales and use taxes on national banks. The majority opinion
concluded that Section 548 established “the outer limit within which States can tax national
banks.”187
Based on its finding of statutory preemption, the majority opinion in First Agricultural
National Bank determined that it was “unnecessary to reach the constitutional question” of
whether modern national banks should be taxable by the states because they “lack any unique
quality giving them the character of a federal instrumentality.”188 Accordingly, the majority
opinion did not address the argument of the three dissenting Justices that modern national banks
no longer qualified as tax-immune federal instrumentalities. The Supreme Court has not referred
to a national bank as an “instrumentalit[y] of the federal government” since its Marquette
decision in 1978.189
In 1969, Congress responded to the decision in First Agricultural National Bank by
amending 12 U.S.C. § 548. As amended, Section 548 provides that a national bank is subject to
state taxation to the same extent as a state bank having its principal office in the same state.190 In
adopting the 1969 amendment, Congress determined that “there is no longer any justification for

their state competitors.”); see supra note 172 and accompanying text (explaining that FDIC-insured national and
state banks have equal authority to act as depositaries of the federal government under 12 U.S.C. § 265).
187
First Agricultural National Bank, 392 U.S. at 345 (opinion for the Court by Black, J.). In contrast to the
majority, the three dissenters in First Agricultural National Bank concluded that Section 548 was not intended to
prohibit other forms of “nondiscriminatory state taxation” of national banks. Id. at 358–59 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
188
Id. at 341 (opinion for the Court by Black, J.).
189
Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 307 (1978) (quoting Davis v. Elmira
Savings Bank, 161 U.S. 275, 283 (1896)).
190
12 U.S.C. § 548; see United States v. State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d 458, 459-61 (9th Cir. 1980)
(discussing the 1969 amendment to Section 548), cert. denied sub nom. Crocker National Bank v. State Board of
Equalization, 451 U.S. 1028 (1981) [hereinafter State Board of Equalization].
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Congress continuing to grant national banks immunities from State taxation which are not
afforded State banks.”191 Thus, the 1969 amendment established equivalent treatment for
national banks and state banks under state tax laws because Congress could not discern any
principled basis for providing national banks with special immunities from those laws. 192
Applying Chief Justice Marshall’s analysis in Osborn, present-day national banks should
be viewed as “private corporation[s]” that engage in the “mere business of banking” with a
“principal object [of] individual trade and individual profit.”193 Given the disappearance of the
public functions of national banks after the FRA’s enactment in 1913, the broad preemption
doctrine announced in Dearing and Easton is not applicable to present-day national banks.
Moreover, Congress rejected and superseded the broad view of preemption expressed in Dearing
and Easton when Congress codified Barnett Bank’s more narrowly-tailored “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).
c. Davis, San Jose, Franklin, and Watters
The Second Circuit also cited Davis, San Jose, Franklin National Bank v. New York,194
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The Senate committee report on the 1969 amendment to Section 548 stated:
There may have at one time been justification for giving national banks privileges and immunities which
were denied State banks, under the theory that national banks are peculiarly an instrumentality of the
Federal government, and, as such, hold a unique and distinct position from that of other institutions.
Without specifically addressing the question of whether national banks remain, in substance, such a Federal
instrumentality, the committee is agreed that there is no longer any justification for Congress continuing to
grant national banks immunities from State taxation which are not afforded State banks.

Senate Report No. 91-530, at 2 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1594, 1595 (quoted in
State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d at 460-61).
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See State Board of Equalization, 639 F.2d at 464 (“The general purpose of [the 1969 amendment to Section 548]
was to promote equality in state taxation of state banks vis-a-vis national banks, and banks vis-a-vis non-bank
corporations.”)
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Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 860; see also Wilmarth, “OCC’s 2004 Preemption Rules, supra note 113, at 24145.
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347 U.S. 373 (1954) [hereinafter Franklin].
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and Watters to support its decision in Cantero. As shown below, those cases are distinguishable
on their facts, and their reasoning has been superseded by subsequent Supreme Court decisions
as well as Congress’s codification of Barnett Bank’s preemption standard in 12 U.S.C. §
25b(b)(1)(B).
In Davis, the Supreme Court held that the NBA preempted the application of a New York
statute to an insolvent national bank. The New York statute required receivers of insolvent
banks to grant a preference in favor of deposits held in those banks by New York savings banks.
In contrast, the NBA required receivers of insolvent national banks to make “ratable
distribution[s]” that ensured a “just and equal distribution . . . among all unsecured creditors.”
The Supreme Court held that there was an “absolute repugnance” between the New York statute
and the NBA’s “plain text.”195 The facts in Davis were very different from those in Cantero.
Unlike the preempted state law in Davis, NYGOL § 5-601 does not impose any obligation or
restriction on national banks that creates a direct conflict with the NBA’s express terms.
The Supreme Court explained in Davis that its decision recognized “the operation of
general and undiscriminating state laws on the contracts of national banks so long as such laws
do not conflict with the letter or the general objects and purposes of [the NBA].”196 As discussed
above, the Supreme Court subsequently made clear in McClellan that Davis represented an
“exception” to the general “rule” upholding the application of state laws to national banks. The
general “rule” announced in McClellan affirmed the “operation of general state laws upon the
dealings and contracts of national banks” as long as those state laws did not “expressly conflict
with the laws of the United States or frustrate the purpose for which the national banks were

195

Davis, 161 U.S. at 283-84.
Id. at 290; see also id. at 287 (stating that “[i]t is certain, that in so far as not repugnant to acts of Congress, the
contracts and dealings of national banks are left subject to the state law”).
196
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created, or impair their efficiency to discharge the duties imposed on them by the law of the
United States.”197 The Supreme Court decided Davis and McClellan in 1896, while national
banks were still performing important “duties” for the federal government in their roles as
leading issuers of the nation’s paper currency and prominent buyers of U.S. government
bonds.198
San Jose held that the NBA preempted the application to national banks of California’s
escheat statute. As discussed above, the California statute required deposits to be escheated to
the state based on “mere dormancy,” without notice or opportunity for hearing on the question of
whether those deposits had actually been abandoned by their owners.199 The Supreme Court
determined that California’s escheat law created an impermissible conflict with the NBA because
it attempted “to qualify in an unusual way agreements between national banks and their
customers,” with the result that depositors in California national banks “might well hesitate to
subject their funds to possible confiscation” under the state statute. 200 As the Court subsequently
explained in Anderson National Bank, California’s escheat law “alter[ed] the contracts of deposit
in a manner considered so unusual and so harsh in its application to depositors as to deter them
from placing or keeping their funds in national banks.”201
Thus, the finding of preemption in San Jose was based on the Supreme Court’s
determination that California’s “unusual” escheat law created “an effective deterrent” to the
solicitation of deposits, thereby creating an “unlawful encroachment on the rights and privileges

McClellan, 164 U.S. at 357. As previously discussed, the Supreme Court reiterated McClellan’s general “rule”
upholding the application of state laws to national banks in St. Louis, 263 U.S. at 656. See supra notes 81-91 and
accompanying text.
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See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text (discussing the public functions performed by national banks
under the original NBA prior to the FRA’s enactment in 1913).
199
See Anderson National Bank, 321 U.S. at 250-51 (describing the California law at issue in San Jose); supra notes
101-03 and accompanying text (same).
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San Jose, 262 U.S. at 369-70.
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Anderson National Bank, 321 U.S. at 250.
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of national banks.”202 In contrast to the California statute in San Jose, NYGOL § 5-601 simply
requires all mortgage lenders doing business in New York to pay a reasonable rate of interest on
their mortgage escrow accounts. The record in Cantero contains no indication that NYGOL §5601 significantly burdens the mortgage escrow services of national banks in New York, or that it
deters New York residents from obtaining those services from national banks. Wells Fargo
Bank, one of BoA’s largest and most important competitors in the residential mortgage market,
has complied with California’s and New York’s minimum-interest-on-mortgage-escrow
statutes.203
Franklin held that federal law preempted the application to national banks of a New York
statute that prohibited all banks—except for state-chartered savings banks and savings and
loans—from using the words “saving” or “savings” (or their equivalent) in advertising their
deposit services.204 The Supreme Court held that the New York statute created a “clear conflict”
with provisions of the FRA and NBA, which authorized national banks to accept savings
deposits. In addition, the state law significantly impaired the incidental power of national banks
to advertise their services. The Court explained that “[m]odern competition for business finds
advertising one of the most usual and useful of weapons,” and there was no indication that
Congress intended to “preclude the use [by national banks] of advertising in any branch of their
authorized business.” The Court concluded that national banks “must be deemed to have the
right to advertise [their savings deposits] by using the commonly understood description which
Congress has specifically selected.”205
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Id. at 250-52 (quotes at 251, 252).
See Lusnak, 883 F.3d at 1190; Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 195.
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Franklin, 373 U.S. at 374, 374-75 n.1.
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Id. at 377-78.
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The New York statute at issue in Franklin imposed a significant burden on the ability of
national banks to compete for savings deposits in New York. As indicated above, the Supreme
Court described advertising as “one of the most usual and useful of weapons” in competing for
business, and the Court found it implausible that Congress “would permit a national bank to
engage in a business but gave no right to let the public know about it.”206 In Barnett Bank, the
Supreme Court evidently viewed Franklin’s preemption analysis as being consistent with
Barnett Bank’s “prevent or significantly interfere” preemption standard. The Court cited and
discussed Franklin both before and after it adopted that standard in Barnett Bank.207
In contrast to the state law preempted in Franklin, NYGOL § 5-601 does not impose a
significant burden on the ability of national banks to offer mortgage escrow services in New
York. As indicated above, the district court in Hymes found that Section 5-601 had a “minimal”
impact on the operations of national banks.208 Consequently, the Second Circuit should have
upheld Section 5-601 under Barnett Bank’s “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption
standard codified in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
Much of the Supreme Court’s discussion of preemption in Watters is consistent with
Barnett Bank. As previously discussed, Watters reiterated Barnett Bank’s “prevent or
significantly interfere” preemption standard.209 To the extent that other statements in Watters
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Barnett Bank, 517 U.S. at 33-35.
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See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the district court’s finding that § 5-601 had a
“minimal” impact on national banks in Hymes, 408 F. Supp. 3d at 185-86, 195-96) (quote at 195).
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could arguably be construed as supporting a broader view of preemption,210 Watters has been
superseded by subsequent events and is no longer a controlling precedent.
Watters held that the NBA preempted Michigan statutes that authorized state officials to
exercise licensing, inspection, and enforcement powers over state-chartered operating
subsidiaries of national banks.211 In Cuomo—decided two years after Watters—the Supreme
Court narrowly limited the scope of its holding in Watters. Cuomo explained:
Watters held that a State may not exercise “‘general supervision and control’”
over a subsidiary of a national bank. . . . All parties to the case agreed that
Michigan’s general oversight regime could not be imposed on national banks; the
sole question was whether operating subsidiaries of national banks enjoyed the
same immunity from state visitation. The opinion addresses and answers no
other question.212
In 2010, the Dodd-Frank Act effectively overruled the “sole question” decided in
Watters. Three of Dodd-Frank’s provisions declare that the NBA does not preempt the
application of state laws to state-chartered subsidiaries, affiliates, and agents of national banks.213
In view of Cuomo and Dodd-Frank, Watters no longer has any precedential effect.
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Delivers a Major Victory for the Dual Banking System and Consumer Protection” (Geo. Wash. Univ. Legal Stud.
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As shown above, none of the Supreme Court decisions cited by the Second Circuit
provides persuasive support for Cantero’s per se preemption rule. In addition, the Supreme
Court’s recent decision in Brown makes clear that all of the decisions cited by the Second Circuit
have been superseded to the extent of their inconsistency with Barnett Bank’s “prevents or
significantly interferes” preemption standard codified in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). In Brown,
the Supreme Court held that “[w]hen Congress supplies a constitutionally valid rule of decision,
federal courts must follow it.”214 The Court also instructed federal courts that they may not rely
on inconsistent statements “extracted” from prior Supreme Court decisions to “override a lawful
congressional command.”215 The Second Circuit’s per se preemption rule is clearly invalid
under Brown because it conflicts with the more narrowly-tailored preemption standard that
Congress codified in Section 25b(b)(1)(B).
Conclusion
The Second Circuit’s decision in Cantero adopted a per se preemption rule under the
NBA that is contrary to the “prevents or significantly interferes” preemption standard established
by the Supreme Court in Barnett Bank and codified by Congress in 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B).
The Second Circuit’s decision creates a direct conflict with the Ninth Circuit’s correct
interpretation of Section 25b(b)(1)(B) in Lusnak. The Supreme Court should reject the Second
Circuit’s erroneous view of preemption in Cantero and endorse the Ninth Circuit’s proper
analysis of preemption in Lusnak.
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